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Abstract
Effects of the competition between the two South locations (Mexico and China) in the North-
ern market (U.S.) is analyzed. By employing a new plant-level data set that covers the universe
of Mexican export assembly plants (maquiladoras) from 1990 to 2006 and exploiting the ex-
ogenous acceleration of Chinese imports in conjunction with the WTO accession of China, the
empirical analysis reveals substantial effect of intensified Chinese competition on maquiladoras.
In particular, competition from China has negative and significant impact on employment and
plant growth, both through the intensive and the extensive margin, on the most unskilled labor
intensive sectors of those threatened by competition from China, leading to sectoral reallocation.
No major effect is found through reallocative channels within industries, but significant increases
in plant productivity and skill intensity are quantified in maquiladoras attributable to competi-
tion from China. The results lend substance to field studies and anecdotal evidence on industrial
upgrading in Mexican Maquiladoras in response to competition with low-wage locations such as
China.
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1 Introduction
China’s size, rapid economic growth and trade performance is being felt across the globe. Especially so
in Mexico which has been a main competitor of China in the United States markets for manufactured
products. By 2003 China had surpassed Mexico as the second most important import supplier to
the Unites States and ranked just after Canada. China’s accelerated trade growth accompanying its
WTO accession provides us with an exogenous source of variation to analyze the impact of international
competition in general. Similarity in export baskets between Chinese and Mexican manufacturers to
the US market makes the competition between Mexico and China even more intense, and the analysis
more revealing.
Maquiladoras are export assembly plants historically specialized in labor-intensive products such as
apparel, footwear, electronics and toys. Since 1965, long before The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), favorable duty regulations with the United States have been in place for maquiladoras.
Since then, close proximity to the US market and relatively cheap labor made Mexico one of the most
favorable offshore destinations for US companies for a long time. In 2006 the Maquiladora industry
in Mexico generated more than 25 billion dollars in foreign exchange, and accounted for 44 percent of
total Mexican manufacturing exports. 94 percent of the Maquiladora export in that year went to the
US.1 Together with enormous growth potential the sector also faces a significant hazard of shrinking
due to its sensitivity to decisions of US firms to source from elsewhere.2
Many developing countries with cheap and abundant labor establish export processing zones (EPZs)3
or programs to attract multinational firms hoping to increase export, create jobs, and generate for-
eign exchange. More importantly developing countries hope that such foreign investment incentive
programs, rather than being a short-run solution to unemployment and a trap of low-value added
facilities with significant vulnerability to shocks, will evolve towards higher value-added production
facilities and eventually gain from foreign direct investment through the transfer of technologies and
1Authors’ calculation using the data from Trade Statistics Specialized Technical Committee, formed by
Banco de Mexico, Instituto Nacional Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa (INEGI), Servicio de Administracio´n Tributaria
(SAT) and the Secretaria de Economia.
2Hanson (2002) stresses that the Maquiladora sector with its impressive growth rates experienced in the
1990s (real value added grew at an annual growth rate of 10 %) and its role in Mexico’s export boom is an
important opportunity for Mexico’s economic development. But it also poses a challenge as it is characterized
by footloose industry.
3EPZs as defined by the International Labour Office (ILO) (2003) report are ”industrial zones with special
incentives to attract foreign investment, in which imported materials undergo some degree of processing before
being exported again.”
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skill. According to the International Labour Office (ILO) (2003) report, the number of countries with
export processing programs grew from 25 in 1975 to 116 in 2002, employing 43 million people, of whom
30 million are employed in China.4 For many countries exports from these programs account for a
sizeable portion of their export earnings, especially so for Mexico and China. As global competition
for jobs and foreign investment intensifies, it is an important question how Maquiladora industries in
Mexico, established as part of an American supply chain, are affected by the intensified competition
with China and whether they can survive this competition possibly by moving to higher value-added
processes thereby continuing to contribute to development of the Mexican host economy.
We investigate the impact of the competition from China on the evolution of the Maquiladora industry.
Relying on an instrumental variable strategy that exploits exogenous intensification of Chinese imports
in the world and the fact that not all plants are exposed to the competition to the same degree, we first
show the first order effects of competition on employment and sales. We then move to the analysis of
the evolution of this industry with respect to plants’ growth, entry, exit and possible moving up. We
employ data from a plant-level survey that covers the universe of Mexican maquiladoras. The sample
starts in 1990 where China’s share in manufacturing trade in the World was 1.74 % and covers until
2006 where China’s share became 8.37 %.5
The impact of China’s trade on both developing and developed economies has recently received signifi-
cant academic attention. Hanson and Robertson (2008) estimate the impact of increase in manufactur-
ing export from China on the demand for export from 10 other developing countries, including Mexico,
covering the period between 1995 and 2005. Based on gravity equation estimates they conclude that
the impact is small but bigger on labor intensive industries. Analyzing the labor market outcomes
in the US in response to the Chinese competition, Autor et al. (2012) quantify significant employ-
ment loss in the manufacturing sector. Firm-level studies also quantify significant impact of Chinese
penetration in the developed markets and point out the importance of trade in firms’ decisions and
industrial development. Bloom et al. (2011) use a panel of establishments from European countries to
test the impact of Chinese imports on the use of Information Technology equipment and innovation,
finding a positive relationship between the two. Bugamelli et al. (2010) test the pro-competitive effect
of Chinese imports on Italian firms, finding a significant effect. These studies point out a heterogenous
impact of Chinese competition within industries which leads to reallocation. This could be because
firms with relatively less sophisticated technologies are more exposed to competition from China and
4The Mexican Maquiladora program has changed from a typical EPZ as the program has matured as
described in the next section. However, the majority of the plants under this program are owned by foreign
companies and work for them as downstream offshore plants.
5Authors’ calculation using World Economic Indicators (WDI) database from the World Bank.
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probably produce products that are more substitutable with Chinese products while others already
utilize the global chain of production with more focus on sophisticated technologies at home. In this
paper, we analyze the competition in the developed country with Chinese products for the plants
that, in the light of these findings, can be expected to be impacted the most: relatively labor-intensive
offshore plants.6
In contrast to previous studies we analyze the competition between two South locations in the third,
Northern, market. Doing this helps to mute endogeneity problems, but does not remove them alto-
gether. It also provides an additional perspective to the literature on the effects of low-wage competi-
tion in advanced countries. We focus entirely on export assembly plants in Mexico that are tied to the
US manufacturing sector. We expect competition between Mexican Maquila and Chinese plants in
the US market, and the competition is perhaps more direct because Mexican and Chinese plants have
very similar export baskets as identified by several studies.7 In addition, we exploit the exogenous
intensification of Chinese imports in the world at the time of the WTO accession of China to identify
the causal impact of competition on the Mexican plants. This paper also provides a comprehensive
analysis of Mexican Maquiladoras using plant-level panel data and thus contributes a deeper under-
standing of this important offshore industry; and it sheds light on the future of export processing
programs or labor intensive offshore locations as global competition intensifies.
Concern is not entirely unjustified that intensified Chinese competition will destroy Maquiladoras as
they are footloose establishments that can easily be relocated. There is much anecdotal evidence
suggesting that maquiladora plants move operations from Mexico to China.8 At the intensive margin,
we find that both employment and plant growth are negatively affected by Chinese competition. More
specifically, after controlling for aggregate factors among which the US depression, a one standard
deviation increase in China’s share of the import penetration rate in the U.S. is found to be associated
with a 23 percentage points decrease in the logarithm of plant employment and a 10 percentage points
6Studies that analyze the impact of intensified competition from China on Mexican Maquiladoras, including
Mollick and Wvalle-Vazquez (2006), and Mendoza (2010) use aggregate data on employment and wages, and
identify Chinese competition as an important factor contributing to Maquiladora slow-down. There are also
recent studies that analyze the impact of Chinese competition on Mexican manufacturing plants which mostly
sell to domestic market, see for example, Iacovone et al. (2010).
7In 2001, the export structure of Mexico is found to be the most similar to China’s export among any Latin
American countries (Devlin, Estevadeordal and Rodriguez-Clare (2006)). The same conclusion is also derived
from Lall and Weiss (2004) and Gallagher and Porzecanski (2007) among others.
8Royal Philips Electronics moved its operation from Cuidad Juarez to China in 2002. Arnases de Juarez
moved its operation to China in 2002. Sanyo Electric Co. closed two of its six Tijuana plants in 2001 and
moved to China and Indonesia (Canas and Coronado (2002)).
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decrease in annual plant growth. At the extensive margin, Chinese competition is also found to cause
plant exits and to discourage entry as the number of entrants and survival probabilities decrease with
intensified Chinese competition.
We find evidence partially supporting the commonly expressed opinion by policy makers in Mexico,
that Chinese competition compels the Maquiladora industry to evolve away from low-tech, labor
intensive manufacturing processes towards higher value added, more technology intensive processes.
Reallocation between industries is found to be very important with significant reshuﬄing of resources
from ’old’ industries, such as apparel, towards more skill-intensive sectors. We also document an
increase in the intensity of skilled labor associated with competition and provide suggestive evidence
for significant within plant productivity improvement of maquiladoras due to heightened competition
from China. Auxiliary data also show substantial increases in the implementation of productivity
enhancing management practices and capacity utilization among maquila plants in the period spanning
the WTO accession of China. The results highlight the importance of international trade in shaping
the development of industries.
In the next section we describe the environment of maquiladora industry and the data used. Motiva-
tional thoughts are presented in section 3. In section 4 the empirical model is outlined, and results
are interpreted in section 5 followed by concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Data Overview
2.1 Mexican Maquiladoras
A typical maquiladora plant imports inputs mostly from the United States, processes them, and then
ships them back. The maquiladora program started in 1965 with the purpose of reducing unemploy-
ment in the border region; it permits tariff-free transaction of the inputs and the machinery between
’a maquiladora plant’ and the foreign companies and it also allows 100 % foreign ownership. Upon
the return of the goods, the shipper pays duties only on the value added by manufacture in Mexico
(Gruben (2001)). In order to benefit from the maquiladora program, a plant has to be registered as a
maquiladora plant.9
Since its introduction, the maquiladora industry moved from consisting of only low-skilled labor inten-
sive plants focusing on simple assembly jobs to more advanced manufacturing processes, like machinery
9The bureaucratic steps necessary for registration were simplified significantly with the 1983 reform.
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and automotive.10 Although initially restricted to the border states and the Baja California free trade
zone, maquiladoras can be established anywhere in Mexico since 1989.
The implementation of NAFTA required Mexico to change certain provisions for the maquiladora
industry, such as eliminating certain tariff benefits. Most importantly, on January of 2001, duty-free
imports from non-NAFTA countries were eliminated because these countries intended to subsequently
re-export to another NAFTA country. These changes were based on the rules of origin that were
established under the treaty, where goods traded between NAFTA countries are allowed duty free
treatment only when the goods satisfy a minimum percentage of North American content. Due to
complaints from leaders of the maquiladora industry, the Mexican government revised its regulations
of the maquiladora sectors and created a sectoral promotion program to protect the duty-free status
of maquiladora imports and thus allowed the maquiladora program to continue to use non-NAFTA
content imports.11 NAFTA also contributed to maquiladoras being allowed to sell their output domes-
tically, but this option is rarely exercised.12 Even after 2001 there is no incentive for a foreign company
not to register as being a maquiladora, if it is part of a foreign chain of production re-exporting its
goods to the US. This is also due to the tax provision (APA) that allows maquiladoras not to pay
income taxes in the same way as the domestic manufacturing industry (Truett and Truett (2007),
Canas and Coronado (2002)).
2.2 Plant-level Data
The maquiladora industry data-set is from Instituto Nacional Estadstica y Geografa (INEGI). INEGI
has conducted a monthly survey of the universe of plants registered under the maquiladora program
until 2007, called the Estadstica de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion (EIME).13 The observa-
10In 1969, 147 companies and 17,000 workers were registered under the Border Industrialization Program.
Among the first companies were RCA (electronics), Convertors (industrial tapes), Sylvania (electronics), Aca-
pulco Fashion (apparel) and Ampex (electronics) (Canas and Coronado (2002)).
11The sectoral promotion program that allow for each maquiladora sector to continue to have the tariff-free
entry of non-NAFTA components was established in December 2000 just before the implementation of the rule
of origin law, so the maquiladora industry has not been affected by it.
12As of 2001 restrictions on domestic sales for maquila plants were removed. If a maquila plant sells into
the domestic market, it will not benefit from the income tax provisions specific to maquiladoras and must pay
the applicable Mexican import duties on imported raw materials used in the production depending on their
specific tariff classification and customs value, as well as any other charges or taxes that are applicable.
13In 2007 a regulatory change was enacted that merges the maquiladora program with an export oriented
program for domestic companies known as the Program for Temporary Imports to Promote Exports (PITEX).
The new program is called Maquiladora Manufacturing Industry and Export Services (IMMEX). As a result,
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tion unit for the industry is a maquiladora establishment, or plant. The data contains firm id’s as well
as plant id’s so that it is possible to identify multi-plant and single-plant firms. INEGI constructed
an annual data set from the monthly surveys, which is the data set used here. The annual panel data
set covers the period between 1990 and 2006 for eleven manufacturing maquiladora industries and one
service industry. For the purpose of this analysis we exclude the service industry.
The majority of the plants are owned by US companies. The ownership status at the plant level can
not be identified due to confidentiality issues, but aggregate capital investment data by country of
ownership in maquiladora industry can be used to get an idea about the distribution of the ownership
by countries. Figure A-1 shows the evolution of capital investment in maquiladora by country of
ownership for selected countries. In 1994 the US share of capital equipment investment was 92.4 %.
The next biggest investor was Japan, with a share of 2.5 %. In 2006 the US share was 88.1 % followed
by Canada and Switzerland both having 1.4 % shares (Source: Banco de Mexico). In terms of sales,
maquiladoras’ export to the US was 99.7 % of the total maquiladora export in 1993. In 2006 94
% of the total maquiladora sales was to the US followed by Canada with a share of 1.7 % (Source:
INEGI). INEGI dropped establishments, which did not respond to the monthly surveys or did not
report output measures, from the data set.14 Thus, the final data set consist of 27,548 plant year
observations that consist of 3,769 plants and 1,455 firms (1655 plants on average per year). See Table
1 for the descriptive statistics. A comparison of the nation-wide maquiladora export value added
from INEGI to the aggregate export value added as reported by the plants in the EIME data-set is
presented in Figure A-2. Figure A-2(a) shows the comparison in level (thousand USD) and A-2(b)
shows it in growth rates. As suggested by the graphs, the plant-level data is very comprehensive and
closely follows the aggregate trend.
INEGI stopped reporting maquiladora data after March 2007 and the data has been merged in to the IMMEX
data.
14Every plant operating under the maquiladora program was legally required to answer the questionnaire.
Our data set reveals that plants which did not answer the questionnaire (although legally required to) are
mostly located in the interior regions of Mexico where the maquiladora concentration is very small. Further
characterization of non-responsive and removed plants is being pursued in correspondence with INEGI.
6
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Plant Level Data Set
Mean Standard Deviation Median Observation
1990
Unskilled Workers (head count) 226 475 71 1194
Skilled Workers (head count) 58 142 13 1194
Materials 89722 339306 12500 1194
Capital 1949 4409 495 1194
Value Added 28988 61407 8131 1194
Gross Output 121769 391755 22618 1194
1995
Unskilled Workers (head count) 258 552 80 1425
Skilled Workers (head count) 61 154 13 1425
Materials 164188 635639 16599 1425
Capital 3499 10317 992 1425
Value Added 35417 76766 10198 1425
Gross Output 205730 717517 28121 1425
2000
Unskilled Workers (head count) 327 770 88 1995
Skilled Workers (head count) 83 202 18 1995
Materials 193324 693715 15319 1995
Capital 4095 9347 1096 1995
Value Added 54800 128617 12807 1995
Gross Output 252991 806776 31073 1995
2005
Unskilled Workers (head count) 345 747 104 1678
Skilled Workers (head count) 94 213 24 1678
Materials 289591 982330 29733 1678
Capital 5546 10827 1731 1678
Value Added 76162 167276 21402 1678
Gross Output 370876 1092718 56792 1678
Total
Unskilled Workers (head count) 288 658 82 27548
Skilled Workers (head count) 75 186 17 27548
Materials 187436 724009 16754 27548
Capital 3867 9668 998 27548
Value Added 50703 123993 12581 27548
Gross Output 242821 818302 31962 27548
Note: Values are expressed in thousand 2002 Mexican peso. Skilled workers are administrators and technicians. Source:
Plant-level Survey of Maquiladoras (INEGI). Authors’ calculation.
In the data-set there is plant-level information for the 9 states of Baja California, Coahuila, Chihuahua,
Distrito Federal, Jalisco, Estado de Me´xico, Nuevo Leo´n, Sonora, and Tamaulipas. Among them Baja
California, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas are the states where the maquiladora concentration
is the highest. For each plant there is an information on hours worked and the number of employees
by job category (administrators, technicians, and workers), wages paid by job category as well as plant
expenditures/inputs, export sales, and value-added. Plants also report rental expenditures on different
capital items, namely machinery, equipment, buildings and office space.15 Our correspondence with
15The original questionnaire correspondences of our rental capital measure are ’alquiler de maquinaria,
equipo y transporte en el pais/rental expenditure of machinery, equipment and transportation equipment in
the country’ and ’alquiler de bienes inmuebles/rental expenditure of real estate’.
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INEGI reveals that rental equipment which includes precision and resistance instruments, rotation
bands, forklifts, trucks with special containers (temperature and toxic waste) etc.. is mostly rented
domestically, although the survey does not collect information on owned imported capital equipment.
The capital variable is proxied by rental capital expenditures. All nominal values are expressed in
thousand 2002 Mexican peso. The separate industry deflators (industry classification for deflators
approximately corresponds to 3-digit SICs) for each maquiladora sector are used to deflate revenues
and material expenditures. Energy deflators are used to deflate fuel and electricity, a machinery
rental deflator to deflate the rental expenditures in machinery and equipment and a building rental
deflator to deflate the building rental expenditures. The deflators are provided by Banco de Me´xico.
Average expenditure shares of labor, rental capital, materials and energy are 27.3, 6.5, 63.7 and 2.7
percents respectively. Reflecting the downstream position of maquiladoras within industries, the share
of imported materials constitute by far the most important expenditure item. 11 manufacturing sectors
are matched with the corresponding US industries in order to construct the industry-level aggregate
variables. Table C-1 presents these 11 industries and corresponding 1997 NAICS codes. The details of
the aggregate data construction is given in the appendix. Plant TFP used in this paper is calculated
as a KLEM index for each industry separately where skilled and unskilled labor are treated as separate
inputs. The details of constructing TFP is described in section C.1 in the Appendix.
3 Theoretical Channels
Studies that analyze the trade compositions of the two main offshore destinations for the US man-
ufacturing sector, Mexico and China, find significant similarity between imports from them in the
US market. China’s recent trade performance in conjunction with its accession to WTO would be
expected to have direct and strong effect on Mexican export assembly plants. Figure 1 below shows
the import shares of China versus Mexico in the US in those manufacturing industries where maquila
plants operate.16 As China’s increasing import share accelerates from 2001, Mexico is loosing share.
Both China and Mexico have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive products compared to the
US. However, China has a comparative advantage in unskilled labor in comparison to Mexico. In
1999, approximately 13 % of the Latin American population had post-secondary education, compared
to 3 % in China (Devlin, Estevadeordal and Rodriguez-Clare (2006)). Factor content theory suggests
that as trade liberalizes in China, industries that disproportionately employ unskilled workers will
shrink in Mexico and the opposite will occur in China. This can happen through the intensive margin,
16These industries are provided in the appendix in Table C-1.
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Figure 1: Chinese and Mexican Import Shares in the US
that export assembly plants operating in Mexico shrink. It can also happen through the extensive
margin that plant exits occur as a result of the competition and/or that heightened competition
discourages entry of new plants in those sectors where China’s comparative advantage is the most.
Since maquiladoras are offshore plants, such developments may also be driven by multinationals that,
as they offshore more labor-intensive tasks to China in response to a fall in trade costs with China,
they may deploy relatively more skill-intensive parts to Mexico or parts in which the relative proximity
of an offshore plant is a more important determinant than labor costs. The former may also give rise
to productivity improvement as in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).17
Product market competition will lead Mexican plants to loose market share in the US market. Typ-
17Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg(2008) show that improvements in the technology for offshoring low-skill
tasks are isomorphic to (low-skilled) labor augmenting technological progress, and that also causes an increase
in real wage of low-skilled workers. But the net effect on real wages depend on the relative magnitudes of
the relative price effect (like in Stolper-Samuelson) and the labor supply effect (the need of re-absorption of
low-skilled workers in the economy).
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ical industrial organization theories with differentiated products predict a negative relationship be-
tween competition and innovation/upgrading, since competition will decrease the rents of innovat-
ing/upgrading for innovators upon innovation.18 This is the Schumpeterian effect that the incentive
to innovate decreases as competition increases. However, the innovation/upgrading decision is also
affected by the difference between the pre-innovation and post-innovation rents (Aghion et al. (2005)).
If the pre-innovation rent disproportionately decreases due to intensified competition, then firms up-
grade or innovate to be able to survive or ’escape’ from the competition as much as possible. It is
shown in Aghion et al. (2005) that such an escape competition effect is stronger when the market
structure is such that technological differences between firms are small. Export assembly industries
both in China and Mexico are mostly based on labor-intensive technologies with no large technological
gaps between plants, so one may expect to see a stronger escape competition effect on plants’ incentive
to upgrade their technologies.19
Another possible channel that can strengthen the escape competition effect is through a parent-
subsidiary relationship. Consider two competing offshore destinations. In response to lower trade
costs in one of the offshore destinations, a parent with a subsidiary in another location would make
a ’credible’ threat of relocating the subsidiary and thus increase the incentive for the manager of the
subsidiary to increase effort and decrease X-inefficiencies.20 Schmidt (1997) shows in a principal-agent
setting that the threat of liquidation can decrease managerial slack and decrease X-inefficiencies. In
our context, the threat of liquidation can be thought of in terms of relocating the subsidiary (or, in
case of subcontracting, the threat of ending the contract and switching to a lower cost partner). Such
a threat should carry greater weight to maquiladoras, many of which are footloose industries.
In a field study conducted in Reynosa, Sargent and Matthews (2006) identify plant manager or
subsidiary-driven upgrading motives as an important source of technology upgrading in maquiladoras.
18Arrow (1962), on the other hand shows that the incentive to do cost-reducing innovation is higher for a
perfectly competitive firm than for a monopolist in the homogeneous product markets due to ”replacement”
or market size effect; that for a monopolist, innovation simply replaces one profitable investment with another.
19Indeed, we find the dispersion is quite low among Maquiladora plants as measured by interquartile measure
which is around 0.20 for the overall industry; it is lower, for example, than for Taiwanese plants as reported
by Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997).
20Principal-agent problems are especially relevant to our context as we focus on the performances of sub-
sidiaries. Papers analyzing the competition and within firm productivity from a principal-agent problem
perspective also include Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), and Hermalin (1992) among others. In Hart (1983)
and Scharfstein (1988), competition affects the informational structure and changes the possibilities that prin-
cipal can make inferences about the manager’s action. In Hermalin (1992) competition changes the manager’s
incentive through the income effect.
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”Due to cost pressures, the parent began sourcing from China rather than Reynosa. [...] Given their
rapidly shrinking character, the plant manager first brought the president of the parent to Reynosa.
The plant manager sold this individual on the idea that while it didn’t make sense to continue with
their existing product line, they had a great management team and perhaps the Reynosa plant could
produce for other divisions.....This effort has been successful; six production lines were sent to Reynosa
and they successfully filled up the plant” (Sargent and Matthews (2006))
We now turn to the empirical model.
4 Empirical Model
Several developments, internal and external to China, contributed to the significant acceleration in
Chinese imports into the US shown in Figure 1, the WTO accession of China being readily identifiable
among them. The concrete changes that WTO membership brought to China include removing uncer-
tainties about MFN rates21, providing China with a way to challenge frequent anti-dumping measures
to its products, and agreeing on TRIMs and TRIPs as part of the WTO membership which can be
seen as a strong signal of commitment by China to the global economic area.22 Significant market
reforms undertaken by China came about as part of the WTO membership negotiation (Branstetter
and Lardy (2006)).
A measure of Chinese competition for Maquiladoras is constructed as the Chinese share of the import
penetration for the matched US industry, following Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006).23
IMPCHjt =
MCHjt
Mjt +Qjt −Xjt (1)
21Before the WTO accession, China’s access to American markets with MFN status had been conditional
on an annual vote in the US Congress that could be swayed partly by China’s human-rights record.
22Another concrete change that WTO membership brought to China is in the textile and clothing industry.
The Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA) that imposes textile quotas on the amount that developing countries
export to developed countries were set to gradual expiration starting from 1995. However, being outside
of WTO, China was ineligible for the quota reductions. With the WTO membership, China experienced
significant quota reductions in 2002. See Brambilla et al. (2009) for a detailed analysis of the impact of the
MFA quota abolishment in the US market and Utar (2012) for a firm and product level analysis of the impact
of quota expiration on Danish textile and apparel industry. Unfortunately due to lack of product-level data at
the plant-level, it is not possible to utilize the quota relaxation experience in the present analysis.
23An alternative would be the ratio of total imports coming from China to the relevant US industry to total
imports in the US industry as used in Bloom et al. (2011). We use both of them. The results are qualitatively
the same.
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where MCHjt denotes the value of imports of industry j products coming from China to the US at
period t. M , Q and X denote total US imports, US production and US exports respectively.
Our identification strategy is based on the fact that some of the maquiladora sectors are not affected
by intensified Chinese imports associated with its accession to WTO as much as sectors with a strong
Chinese comparative advantage. Across sector variation in the degree of Chinese competition can
be due to structural reasons such as transportation costs, or relative skill-intensity of the production
processes. The two maquiladora sectors with the lowest share of skilled employees (administrators
and technicians) over total employment are Apparel and Toys industries. The sectors with the highest
share of skilled employees are Food and Transportation Equipment industries. Various reasons for the
variation in the Chinese comparative advantage will be reflected in the Chinese share of the import-
penetration rate. Based on the first and last quartiles of the Chinese share of import penetration in the
US market before China’s WTO accession in 1999, we identify low threat industries where minimum
Chinese presence and threat is expected, and high threat industries where a high degree of Chinese
threat is expected. The low threat industries are Chemicals, Transportation (Auto Parts) and Food
products (Ecogroups 5, 6, and 1); high threat industries are Apparel, Footwear and Leather, and
Toys and Sporting goods (Ecogroups 2, 3, and 10).24 Note that two of the three industries that are
most exposed to competition from China have the lowest skill-intensity rates among all maquiladora
industries, while two of the three industries that are least exposed to the competition are ranked
highest in terms of skill-intensity.
The figure below shows the (maquila) employment weighted averages of the Chinese share of the
import penetration rate (IMPCH) among all Ecogroups, as well as among high threat, and low threat
industries.
Both the sectoral variation but also the variation across time in the slope, as seen in the figure, will
help to identify the Chinese competition effect.
We use the Chinese share of the import-penetration in the US market, not in Mexico, so it is expected
to be independent from the macroeconomic changes in Mexican industry. However, Maquiladoras are
24The first quartile of the Chinese share of the import penetration rate in 1999 is 0.006 and the sectors that
have IMPCH value lower than the first quartile are Ecogroups 5, 6, and 1. The third quartile of the Chinese
share of the import penetration rate in 1999 is 0.071 and the sectors that have a IMPCH value higher than
the third quartile are Ecogroups 2, 3, and 10. The sectors that do not belong to any of these groups can then
be said to be intermediately exposed to Chinese competition. These are Furniture and Wood products, Metal
products and non-electrical machinery parts, Electrical machinery and equipment assembly, Electronics and
Miscellaneous manufacturing (Ecogroups 4, 7, 8, 9, and 11).
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Figure 2: The Chinese Share of Import Penetration Rate
integrated into the US sectors as they are part of the US production chain. Thus unobserved demand
or technology shocks for particular products or industries in the US market can still be correlated with
both Maquiladora sales and the Chinese sales in the US markets. In order to ’extract’ exogenously
driven acceleration of the Chinese imports in the US market an instrumental variable approach is
used.25
The empirical approach is presented in more detail below.
25Alternatively, one can also use the sectoral grouping in exposure to Chinese competition together with
the WTO accession of China in an difference-in-difference strategy. The results are robust and available upon
request.
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4.1 Regression Equations
Consider the following specification:
lnYijst = α0 + α1Xijst + α2Zjt + α3IMPCHjt + α4IMPCHjt ∗ xijst+∑
ts
δY Sts Y eart ∗ States + ui + ijst
(2)
where Yijst refers to the variable of interest (total employment as measured by head count, total sales,
value-added, employment growth, total factor productivity index) at plant i in industry j located in
state s at year t. By utilizing the panel aspect of our data, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity ui,
which may be correlated with regressors, and estimate equation 2 using OLS. Interactive state-by-year
fixed effects are added to control for aggregate shocks that may affect the variable of interest across all
sectors, but may vary across different states due, for example, to local labor market conditions. The
standard errors are clustered by each industry in each year to account for correlation of shocks within
each industry-year cell as suggested by Moulton (1990). Vector X includes relevant time varying
plant-level controls; these are a multi-plant dummy, and age dummies.26 Vector Z includes time
varying industry-wide controls; in general these are industry aggregate variables for the matched US
industries that may affect the demand for a particular maquiladora sector: import-penetration rate of
the corresponding US industry calculated without the imports from China and Mexico, IMPjt, the
industry hourly wages relative to the corresponding measure in the matched US industry, RelWagejt,
and the logarithm of the production index of the matched US industries to control for the sector
specific business cycles, lnUSPIjt.
27 The Chinese competition measure is also interacted with several
variables of interests xijst (productivity, skill-intensity, capital-labor ratio); to see if trade between
the US and China has a disproportionate effect on any particular type of export-assembly plants in
Mexico.
If there is an increase in demand for particular products in the US, which triggers disproportionate
increase in Chinese imports in those categories, perhaps due to the production content of those products
(labor intensity), then it is likely that this will have the same effect on Mexican Maquiladora sales
in those product categories and for the same reason. This is also true for unobservable technology
shocks, say new innovations on labor cost saving technology. This type of endogeneity bias should
work against finding any impact of Chinese competition, because both Mexican and Chinese imports
26Since INEGI does not ask what year a plant was established, three age dummies are constructed according
to the number of years that plants have been in the sample since 1990 as follows: young (Age Dummy1: 1− 4
years), mid-age (Age Dummy2: 5−9 years), and old (Age Dummy3: >= 10 years). Age Dummy 3 is excluded
from the regressions.
27Details of these data are given in the appendix.
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are expected to react to these types of unobservable shocks in the same direction. This correlation
between Chinese and Mexican imports, driven by unobservable shocks, must be stronger for products
that are more substitutable (or where both China’s and Mexico’s comparative advantages are high in
comparison to the US) hence muting the competition effect.
Since we are interested in capturing accelerating Chinese imports in the wake of the WTO accession, the
instruments should capture this ’China’ driven component unrelated to the US demand factors. One
choice of instrument for the Chinese share of import penetration rate could be the worldwide Chinese
imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 Chinese import
penetration rate in the corresponding US NAICS for each Maquiladora sector, IMPCHj99 ∗ CHIMPtWIMPt .
CHIMPt denotes the worldwide merchandise imports from China and WIMPt denotes the total
merchandise imports. The worldwide Chinese imports must be exogenous from the perspective of
Mexican/US plants as it is expected to be driven by China itself. By interacting it with the cross-
sectional shares before China’s accession to the WTO, we get the cross-industry variation in the degree
of Chinese comparative advantage.28
While this instrument should be free from most of the endogeneity concerns by construction and should
extract exogenously driven growth component in Chinese imports in the world, it is still possible that it
will be sensitive to possible correlation between the initial conditions of the US industries and the future
technology or demand shocks. To address this, an improved version of that instrument is constructed
using the 1999 shares of Chinese imports in other advanced/high income countries and is used as the
default instrument.29 That is, the default instrument used in the analysis is
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt
where OAdvCHIMPj99 is the total imports into 8 high-income countries from China excluding the
US in the corresponding industry j at year 1999 and OAdvTOTIMPj99 denotes the total imports in
the corresponding industry j at year 1999. Since a possible left-over bias should mute the competition
effect due to Chinese and Mexican production content relative to the US, as explained above, to the
extent that the cross-sectional shares of the market penetration by Chinese goods in US industries is
correlated with the unobservable shocks, IMPCHj99 ∗ CHIMPtWIMPt is expected to produce lower negative
magnitudes compared to
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt .
For the purpose of comparison, we also follow Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2012) and perform the
28A similar instrumenting strategy for the Chinese import growth in Europe is also used in Bloom et al.
(2011).
29The comparative advantage of Chinese industries with respect to American industries must be similar to
the comparative advantage that they have against other high income countries’ industries. The 8 countries
chosen are the same countries used in Autor et al. (2012). These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland.
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analysis by instrumenting the Chinese share of import penetration rate with the Chinese import
shares in other high-income countries,
OAdvCHIMPjt
OAdvTOTIMPjt
.30 The instruments should capture the supply
side driven growth component of Chinese imports independent from the US demand factors.
The import penetration rate without Chinese and Mexican imports, defined below, is also used as an
industry-level control variable.
IMPjt =
Mjt −MCHjt −MMXjt
Mjt +Qjt −Xjt (3)
Here MMXjt denotes the value of imports of industry j products coming from Mexico to the US at
period t. In order to instrument the import penetration rate calculated without Chinese and Mexican
imports, IMP , the instruments used are the industry specific exchange rates for the US industry, where
the weights for each trading partner’s currency are lagged shares of imports of each particular trading
partner, lnMERlag, and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican and
Chinese imports, LagIMP,.31
5 Results
5.1 First Order Effects
If the competition with China in the US market is felt significantly among Maquiladoras then one
expects to see the impact on maquila sales, export value-added and employment levels. We first
quantify these ’first order effects’ before moving on to the dynamic effects of the competition on the
evolution of the Maquiladora industry in plant growths, entry, exit and possible moving up.
5.1.1 Maquila Exports
The effects of Chinese competition on the sales and export value-added of Mexican maquiladoras are
presented in Table 2. In Panel A the dependent variable is the logarithm of plant sales. In column 1
of Panel A, the coefficient of the Chinese share of import penetration rate is negative and significant
30We choose the same countries chosen by Autor et al. (2012) but we had to exclude Denmark because there
was missing data in 1997 in certain HS-categories in the UN-Comtrade database. So
OAdvCHIMPjt
OAdvTOTIMPjt
include the
7 high-income countries which are Australia, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland.
This instrument starts in 1991 instead of 1990 because data from unified Germany is only available starting
from 1990.
31The sources of these data are stated in the Appendix.
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at the 1 percent level. The import penetration rate calculated without the imports from China and
Mexico, IMP , is controlled for in column 2, and the coefficient increases its magnitude and keeps its
significance. In column 3 additional industry-level controls are included; the Chinese share of import-
penetration keeps its significance at the 1 percent level. The coefficient in column 3 indicates that a
one standard deviation increase in the Chinese share of import penetration rate (7 percentage point
increase) is associated with a 0.08 standard deviation (18 percentage point) decrease in log sales. Both
the US production index and the relative wages are also found to be statistically significant, confirming
the close ties of the maquiladora industry to the US production process. The magnitudes indicate that
a one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the US production index in the corresponding
industry is associated with a 0.02 standard deviation increase in log sales. A one standard deviation
increase in the relative wages is, on the other hand, associated with a 0.04 standard deviation decrease
in log sales. The instrumental variable results are presented in columns 4 and 5. The instrument for the
Chinese share is the worldwide Chinese share of import interacted with the 1999 cross-sectional shares
of the Chinese import shares in other advanced countries,
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt . The instrument
is strongly correlated with IMPCH and the IV coefficient is larger in magnitude. As discussed in
the previous section, this suggests that unobservable shocks bias the OLS coefficients downward. The
results are in line with the previous findings about the strong substitutability between the Chinese
and Mexican export bundles in the US market.
In Panel B of Table 2 the results for export value-added are presented.32 The results are quite similar
to the sales results with slightly lower magnitudes for the coefficient estimate of Chinese competition.33
The coefficient in column 3 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the Chinese penetration
in the US market is associated with a 0.09 standard deviation (16 percentage points) decrease in log
value-added. Similarly, the magnitudes of the industry-level control variables indicate that a one
standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the US production index in the corresponding industry
and the relative wages are associated with a 0.02 standard deviation increase and a 0.04 standard
deviation decrease in log export value-added respectively. The IV coefficient is significant and larger
32Although the survey, EIME, records this variable as ’export value added’ it is essentially total value-
added. Historically all maquilas’ sales are exported. Although NAFTA allowed maquilas to sell their products
domestically as of 2001, this option has rarely been used due to tax disadvantages as discussed in section 2.1.
Hence INEGI did not ask a separate question about the plants’ domestic sales in the EIME survey. INEGI
included a question about domestic sales in another survey (ENESTyC) conducted among a sample of maquila
plants in 2005. The percentage of domestic sales among maquila plants surveyed by INEGI as part of the
ENESTyC in 2005 is 3 %.
33Similar results are obtained when the dependent variable is the logarithm of profit; they are available upon
request.
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than the respective specification with OLS, indicating that the instrumenting variable strategy is
correcting the bias resulting from shocks that lead both Maquiladora and Chinese sales in the US to
move in the same direction. The results are robust.
5.1.2 Employment
The estimation results of employment are presented in Table 3. The coefficient of the Chinese share
of the import penetration rate is found to be significant at the 1 percent level in every specification,
and the magnitude increases in the IV specifications. The magnitude in column 2 indicates that
a one standard deviation increase in the Chinese share of the import penetration rate in the US
market is associated with a 0.14 standard deviation (25 percentage points) decrease in the logarithm
of employment. The coefficient of IMP is only significant at the 10 percent level in column 2, the
magnitude indicates a 0.07 standard deviation decrease in the logarithm of employment as a result of
a one standard deviation increase in the general import penetration rate. In column 3 all industry
level controls are included. The coefficient of IMPCH is still significant at the 1 percent level with a
magnitude which indicates a 23 percentage points decline in the logarithm of employment in response
to a one standard deviation increase IMPCH.
In columns 4 and 5, the IV results are presented with the default instrument, the worldwide Chinese
share of import interacted with the 1999 cross-sectional import share from China in other advanced
countries. The results are robust, and they confirm that Chinese imports in the US market are
associated with lower employment in Maquiladora industries. Note the lower coefficient estimates
for sales and value-added compared to the coefficient estimates for employment, indicating a possible
increase in labor productivity.
For the purpose of comparison, results obtained with alternative instruments, which are the worldwide
Chinese imports relative to the total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares of IMPCH and
the share of Chinese imports in other advanced countries (in the spirit of Autor et al. (2012)), are
shown in appendix B column 1 of Table B-1 and Table B-2. The first stage coefficients indicate a
strong correlation of the instruments with IMPCH (Panel B). While in all specifications the Chinese
penetration in the US market is found to be negative and significant at the 1 percent level, the
magnitude difference between column 1 of Table B-1 and column 4 of Table 3 is in line with the
hypothesis that possible correlation between the initial conditions of the US industries and future
demand shocks leads to a muted negative competition effect (but it is still bigger than the corresponding
OLS results).
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5.2 Dynamic Effects
5.2.1 Plant Growth
Estimation results of the employment growth equation are presented in Table 4.34 The coefficient of
the Chinese penetration in the US market is found to be negative and significant in every specification.
The magnitude in column 2 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the Chinese share of
import penetration rate (6.4 percentage point increase) is associated with a decrease in annual plant
employment growth of 0.16 standard deviation or 12 percentage points. The coefficient of the import
penetration rate, IMP , is also found to be negative and significant at the 5 % level in column 2,
indicating a negative association between the general import penetration rate in the US market and
plant growths in Maquiladoras. When other industry level controls, namely Mexican industry hourly
wages relative to the US counterpart, and the US industry production index are added in column 3,
the coefficient in front of the Chinese share of import penetration is still significant at the 5 % level.
The coefficient of the US production index is found to be positive and significant at the 10 % level,
confirming the close ties of maquila plants with US manufacturing. It also indicates the importance
of the US economic crisis in the Mexican economy through its maquiladora sector. Bergin et al.
(2009) documents excess volatility of maquiladoras in comparison to the US counterparts, which may
imply that the US firms respond to shocks more strongly in their offshore plants than in their home
plants. The magnitudes in column 3 imply that a one standard deviation increase in the Chinese
penetration and in the logarithm of the US production index are associated with a decrease in annual
plant employment growth of 0.13 standard deviation (10 percentage points) and an increase of 0.05
standard deviation (3 percentage points) respectively.
Instrumental variable regression results presented in columns 4 to 5 confirm the finding that Chinese
imports in the US market lead to lower employment growth in Maquiladora industries.35
Although both plant TFP and size are important determinants of plant growth, we do not control for
them in these regressions since they are expected to respond to intensified competition from China.
If plants get smaller as a result of Chinese competition (as already shown) and/or increase their
performance (will be shown) as a result of Chinese competition, we expect bigger OLS coefficients
34Employment growth is defined as the change in the logarithm of the total number of employees from one
year to the next among continuing plants (exclusive of entry and exit).
35The average annual aggregate employment growth in the Maquiladora industry between 1990 and 2000
was 10.6 percent, and it declined to -1.2 percent between 2001 and 2006. Our estimates indicate (crudely)
that close to half of the decline in employment growth after 2001 can be attributed to Chinese competition.
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once plant TFP and size dummies are controlled for. In Table B-3 in appendix B we repeat the
analysis additionally controlling for plant TFP and crude size dummies.36 The OLS coefficients are
found to be bigger. The results are robust.37
In Table 5 in columns 1, 2 and 3 the Chinese competition proxy is interacted with plant TFP, skill
intensity as measured by the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers and capital-labor ratio as
measured by the rental expenditures of machinery, equipment and building to total wages respectively.
None of the interaction terms are significant.38 So there is no indication that intensified Chinese
competition as proxied with the Chinese share of the import penetration rate in the US causes a
disproportionate decrease in employment growth, especially in the group of low-productivity plants,
low-skill intensive plants or low capital-intensive plants within an industry.39 Chinese exports to
the US should not be expected to exhibit significantly higher substitutability with the lower end of
the distribution of maquiladora products in comparison to the upper end for a given industry, since
offshore plants within the same 3-4 digit industries should be relatively homogeneous as they are
utilized mainly for labor intensive processes. It is more plausible to think, on the other hand, that
imports from China to Europe compete more with European firms’ products located at the low end
of the distribution as documented by Bloom et al. (2011) and Bugamelli et al. (2010).
5.2.2 Plant Shutdowns
A probit model is used to analyze the impact of Chinese competition on maquiladora exit. The exit
variable, χit, is a dummy variable that takes 1 if plant i exits at period t+1. In these regressions
aggregate shocks and industry specific factors are controlled for using the full set of state by year and
industry fixed effects. The results, presented in Table 6, show significant effect of Chinese competition
on maquiladora exit.
Column 2 magnitudes indicate that a marginal change in the Chinese penetration, IMPCH, from
the average of 6 % leads to a 27 % increase in probability of plant exits while a marginal change in
36Five dummies are constructed for plant size, measured by the number of employees, for each of the ranges
1-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-1000 and 1000+. The smallest size category is excluded from the regression.
37The plant-level coefficients in all of the regressions are significant and they all have the expected signs.
Employment growth decreases with age and size and increases with productivity. It is usual to find that
younger and smaller firms and plants grow faster conditional on survival (Dunne et al. (1989)). Jovanovic
(1982) provides a theoretical foundation through learning. We also find that on average employment growth
is higher in plants that belong to an entity which owns other maquiladora plants (multi-plant firms).
38The results are similar, when plant fixed effects are replaced with industry fixed effects.
39Note that including all plant characteristics and interactions at the same time does not change the results.
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the general import penetration, IMP , is associated with a 15 % increase. The economic downturn of
the US in 2001 is probably captured with IMP , and when additional industry level controls including
the industry-specific business cycle variable, lnUSPI, and the relative wages, RelWage, are added
in column 3, the coefficient of the Chinese penetration rate is still significant and positive. The IV
results are presented in columns 4 to 5 and the results are robust.
Some of the plant-level factors that are important in determining an exit decision, but that are po-
tentially endogenous to the competition such as TFP and size are not included at first. So as an
additional check, both TFP and employment variables are included in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
The coefficient of the Chinese penetration in the US market is positive and significant in all of the spec-
ifications. The coefficients of the plant-level variables indicate a significant and negative relationship
between exit and size as well as between exit and productivity. We also find evidence of non-linearities
in the relationship between productivity and exit. The impact of productivity on exit diminishes with
productivity (the coefficient of productivity square is negative and significant).
5.2.3 Plant Births
Since the plant-level data does not provide much insight into the potential entrants’ decision other
than the number of realized entries, we aggregate the plant-level data to industry-level and estimate
the equation
ENTRYjt = γ0 + γ1Zjt + γ2IMPCHjt +
∑
t
δYt Y eart +
∑
j
δIj Industryj + jt (4)
to analyze the impact of Chinese competition on plant entry. ENTRYjt is the total number of entrants
in industry j at period t. To control for industry-specific factors that affect entry, such as different
levels of sunk entry costs associated with starting up a plant, say, in the apparel sector versus in auto
parts, industry fixed effects are included. The year dummies in this regression will control for aggregate
shocks, such as exchange rate, that may affect the entry decision to maquiladoras in the same way
across sectors as it affects the relative production costs between Mexico and the US. Zjt denotes other
industry-level controls. If intensified Chinese competition discourages entry of new maquila plants in
Mexico, we expect γ2 to be negative. Due to the count data nature of the dependent variable, equation
4 is estimated using Poisson and negative binomial regressions. The dependent variable exhibits over-
dispersion so we opted for the negative binomial model.40 The results are presented in Table 7. A
40In this specification the dependent variable, conditional on the regressors, is assumed to be distributed
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negative and significant effect of the Chinese share of import penetration is found on entry. Can this
effect be generalized to imports from everywhere else? Or is it especially true for Chinese competition?
The import penetration rate is added in column 2. A weakly significant effect of import penetration in
the US market is found on entry of offshore plants in Mexico. Another potential factor that may affect
entry decisions is cost of labor in Mexico relative to the US. Industry hourly wages of unskilled workers
in the Mexican maquiladora sectors relative to the corresponding US industries are included in column
3. The coefficient of the relative wage is negative and weakly significant. A measure of the ’general
level of competitiveness’ of the US market is used in the fourth column, namely the industry-specific
exchange rate, lnMER,. An increase in this measure reflects the appreciation of the US dollar. We
find a negative and significant effect indicating that a decrease in the level competitiveness of the US
industry is associated with a lower rate of entry to Mexican maquiladoras. But the Chinese share of
import penetration rate keeps its sign and significance in column 4. In column 5, all of the controls
are included. The coefficient of the Chinese share of import penetration rate is still significant at the
1 percent level. Intensified Chinese competition associated with China’s WTO accession is found to
deter entry to Mexican maquiladoras.41 The results also indicate that labor cost saving motives and
demand in the US markets are important factors in affecting entry to the Maquiladora industry.
Since exit is analyzed at the micro level and entry is analyzed at the aggregate level, an analysis of
entry and exit rates (the number of entrants and exiting plants at period t over the total number of
plants at period t) are presented in Table 8 for the purpose of comparison, and the results are robust.
5.3 Moving Up?
The analysis so far reveals a sizable negative impact of intensified Chinese competition on employment,
plant growth, entry and exit of Mexican maquiladoras. As sectors that are most exposed to the
competition are found to be shrinking, the competition with China is also found to trigger significant
sectoral reallocation towards generally more skill-intensive sectors. On the other hand the reallocation
within sectors triggered by competition is not found to be contributing to possible moving up. However,
even in the traditionally labor-intensive apparel sector Bair and Gereffi (2003) identify recent industrial
upgrading from purely garment assembly to full production facilities with cutting rooms, industrial
with Negative Binomial distribution. It is a Poisson-like distribution but, unlike Poisson, equi-dispersion
(that is, mean equals variance V ar(yi|xi) = exp(x′iβ) ) is not imposed. The variance is assumed to be
V ar(yi|xi) = exp(x′iβ) + α ∗ (exp(x
′
i)
2 where α is an over-dispersion parameter, y is ENTRY , and x is the
vector of regressors.
41The results are robust to the IV approach with the dependent variable being the logarithmic transformation
of 1 plus the number of entry ln(ENTRY + 1). The results are available upon request.
22
laundries and finishing plants. In order to understand if competition with China triggers ascending in
the global production chain for maquiladoras, the effect of the competition on within plant productivity
and skill-intensity is presented in this section, starting with an analysis of a potential link between the
competition and plant productivity.
5.3.1 Productivity
Before presenting productivity results, some qualification is necessary: Capital equipment owned by
the multinational and made available for the maquila plants is not included in the capital expenditure
item collected by INEGI. This can potentially contribute to the productivity results if those plants
that are threatened most by the competition have increased capital intensities, for example because the
type of production line changes, requiring an upgrade in capital equipments. However, such possible
changes would still constitute moving up.
Productivity results are presented in Table 9. The first two columns of Table 9 present OLS results
with no entry and exit controls. The coefficient estimates of the Chinese penetration in the US is
significant and positive at the 1 percent level while the coefficient estimate of IMP is negative and
insignificant. The magnitude of the Chinese penetration coefficient in column 2 indicates that a one
standard deviation increase in the Chinese import penetration in the US market increases the logarithm
of plant productivity by 0.11 standard deviation unit or by 3 percentage points. In columns 3 and 4
entry and exit dummies as well as the interaction variable between entry and exit with the Chinese
penetration are included, and the Chinese penetration coefficient is still positive and significant. Since
plant fixed effects are controlled for, entry and exit dummies will capture productivity changes within
plants in comparison to the time when they enter and when they shut down rather than capturing
cross-sectional differences. The negative and significant coefficient on the exit dummy in column 3
then indicates that the productivity levels of those plants are on average 2 % lower at the last year of
their participation in comparison to the previous years. Note that it may still be the case that plants
that exit have negative productivity shocks in the year that they exit, which is not observable. Does
the competition have effect on productivity through entry and exit? The coefficient of the interaction
between exit and the Chinese imports is positive, indicating that exit is not contributing to the positive
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impact of competition on productivity42,43. The IV results are presented in columns 5 to 6 and the
OLS results presented in columns 1 and 2 are robust.44 We also conduct an analysis of productivity
using the balanced sample excluding all plants that enter and/or exit during the sample period, and
the results, presented in Table B-5, show robust and significant productivity improvement attributable
to the competition.
The productivity estimates are based on a constant returns to scale assumption. If the underlying
scale elasticities are less than one, we may be capturing a scale effect. Alternatively productivity is
estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin with imported materials as a proxy variable. It is also estimated
using the fixed effect model.45 The fixed effect model is known to underestimate the scale. The scale
elasticities are found to be on average 0.9, which justifies the use of index methodology. The results on
the impact of Chinese competition are robust to both Levinsohn-Petrin and fixed effect estimates of
the productivity measures. In Table B-6 the productivity regression is presented with the dependent
variables being the alternative TFP measure derived from the fixed effect model.
Most available plant-level data do not contain plant-level physical quantities and prices, and the
one used here is no exception. This gives rise to the concern that markups may be captured by
the productivity measure as they are also expected to respond to heightened competition. In this
case, however, markups should go down as competition intensifies more so for those plants facing the
toughest competition, causing downward bias in the estimates.46 Additionally, price variation between
42In order to allow productivity comparisons between a group of entrants/exiters with continuing plants,
the OLS analysis with entry and exit dummies is repeated replacing the plant fixed effects with industry fixed
effects. The interactions between entry and exit dummies and the Chinese imports variable are still found to
be positive and insignificant, confirming the findings obtained using the plant-fixed effects. These results are
available upon request.
43Sargent and Matthews (2009) survey managers of about 100 maquila plants and they find no relationship
between the use of just-in-time inventory practices, technology-intensive production systems and total quality
management practices and the recently observed plant deaths. The present results with the extensive data-set
confirm their finding.
44While entry and exit dummies are not included in the IV regressions in Table 9 as they are potentially
endogenous to competition, IV results including entry and exit dummies are also robust and available upon
request.
45Unfortunately we cannot estimate the production function using Olley and Pakes methodology due to
lack of investment data. One drawback of the L-P approach in this context is related to the assumption of
the evolution of capital. Since we only have information about rental capital, it may be arguable to treat the
capital variable as a state variable, so we think the fixed effect model is more reliable.
46The analysis on plant profit confirms this insight by revealing a weakly significant negative effect of the
Chinese penetration; it is available upon request.
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maquiladora plants must be limited compared to the manufacturing industries; maquiladora plants
mainly focus on downstream processes within 3-4 digit manufacturing sectors.
5.3.2 Skill Intensity
The construction of the TFP index, as explained in the appendix, takes skilled versus unskilled employ-
ees (technicians and administrative versus workers) as separate inputs. Thus changes in skill intensity
should not drive the productivity result. Still it is interesting to look at the evolution of the skill
intensities in their own right. Looking at the average skill intensity (the ratio of administrators and
technicians to unskilled workers) of the entrants (Table A-2) we find that the mean skill-intensity of
entrants increased from 0.34 to 0.61 after 2001. Since the mean size of entrants also increases slightly
in comparison to the pre-2001 level, this increase among entrants is not driven by size changes. The
increase in skill intensity is in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which would suggest growth in
skill-intensive jobs in Mexico as a result of competition from less skill intensive China. Skill-intensity
also increases among continuing plants from 0.28 to 0.38 on average after 2001.
Utar (2012) shows that both sales and employment of Danish Textile and Clothing (T&C) firms decline
significantly in response to the MFA quota abolishment for Chinese T&C products in conjunction with
China’s accession to WTO. The decline in employment happens mostly in the low-skill part of the
production process, leading to compositional changes in the organization of the Danish T&C firms
towards higher skill intensity. While the data in the present analysis does not provide education and
specific occupation information of the individual employees, broad occupation categories are used to
examine for a similar response among Maquiladoras as shown in Table 10 and Table 11.47 In Table
10 the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the number of skilled employees (technicians
and administrators) to the number of unskilled employees (workers). In column 1, the coefficient of
the Chinese penetration is positive but insignificant. In column 2 the general import penetration rate
is included and the coefficient of IMPCH is found to be positive and significant at the 5 percent level.
Since the sectors that are most exposed to the competition from China are relatively less skill intensive
sectors, it is possible that the unobservable shocks that are correlated with both Mexican and Chinese
imports in the US market are accentuated. In response to positive demand shocks to, for example,
electronics goods both Chinese penetration and Maquiladora sales are expected to increase in the US.
If maquila plants hire additional and maybe temporary unskilled workers to meet the excess demand,
this may cause downward bias in the OLS coefficient for skill-intensity. In columns 3 and 4, the IV
47If there is an increase in relative demand for skilled workers, relative skill intensity should increase as long
as the relative skilled labor supply is not perfectly inelastic.
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results indicate that the Chinese competition triggers an increase in skill intensities.
In Table 11 the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio between the average wages of skilled
employees versus unskilled employees. The coefficients of Chinese penetration in the US market are
found to be positive and significant in OLS specifications. Similar results are obtained with the
instrumental variable approach as presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 11. Note that wages are
measured as average per person wages without controlling for workers’ experience and education levels
(since they are not available in the data-set), so any increase in education level among skilled employees
may also contribute to the positive effect.48 The positive effect could also be driven by downward
pressure on wages of unskilled workers due to competition with China. The results altogether show
that maquila plants increase their skill-intensities probably because they lay off unskilled workers
disproportionately as a result of the competition with China. The results are also in line with a
general industrial upgrading triggered by the competition.
5.3.3 Additional Analysis and Potential Sources of Productivity Gain
In order to remove a possible differential effect of the 1994 peso crisis and the implementation of
NAFTA on maquiladora industries as well as any other non-Chinese competition effect, and to ensure
that the main source of identification comes from the acceleration of the Chinese imports around the
time of China’s WTO accession, the full-set of results are reproduced with the 1999-2006 sample and
presented in Appendix B in Tables B-7 and B-8.49 The results are robust.
We decompose aggregate productivity growth between 1999 and 2006 into components of within-plant,
between plants within industry, turnover and between sectors reallocation.50 Table A-3 presents the
results. Between 1999 and 2006 the aggregate productivity increase in Maquiladoras is calculated to
7.8 %. A significant role of between sector reallocation is found, in that 50 % of the observed growth
can be attributed to reallocation between Maquiladora sectors. Confirming our findings, only 3.8 %
of the total growth is due to reallocation between continuing plants within industries while more than
30 % of the observed growth is due to within-plant productivity improvement.
The plant-level survey (EIME) does not allow a deeper analysis of the sources of within-plant pro-
48Feenstra and Hanson (1997) show that an increase in the relative skilled wages in Mexico during the 1980s
is associated with an increase in FDI activities in the Maquiladora sector.
49See for example Verhoogen (2008) for an excellent work that shows differential impact of the 1994 peso
crisis on Mexican manufacturing plants’ quality upgrading motives. This work, however, is concerned with
differential impact across exporters versus non-exporters. All plants in our data-set are by definition exporters.
50The details of the decomposition analysis is presented in the appendix.
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ductivity gain, but INEGI also conducts technology surveys, called ”Encuesta Nacional De Empleo,
Salarios, Tecnolog`ıa Y Capacitacio`n, ENESTyC” (National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology
and Training).51 This survey was also conducted among a sample of maquiladoras in 1999, 2001 and
2005. Information regarding operational and technological capabilities of maquiladoras from this sur-
vey is presented in Tables A-4 to A-7, and gives insight into potential sources of productivity gain.52
53 Summary statistics indicate that surveyed maquila plants are mainly large foreign (US) owned
plants. 589, 675 and 791 maquila plants are surveyed in 1999, 2001 and 2005 respectively. When we
compare 1999 with 2005 results, we see that the number of plants that report performing research and
development increases from 39 to 46 %. Plants that report performing product development increases
from 21 to 32 %. Table A-6 presents percentage capacity utilization among maquila plants as well
as among non-maquila manufacturing plants. The average capacity utilization increases substantially
from 81 to 86 % among maquilas. Interestingly, there is no comparable increase in capacity utiliza-
tion among non-maquila manufacturing plants. In Table A-7, we present information on management
techniques that is derived from ENESTyC 2005.54 Approximately 20 % of 642 plants implements Just
in Time inventory methods before 2000 and this increases to 41 % in the beginning of 2005. Similarly
the percentage of firms implementing other productivity enhancing management techniques such as
Total Quality Management, Job Rotation, Process Re-engineering, Re-arrangement of Equipment55
also doubles or more than doubles between 2000 and 2005.
51The survey covers all plants with 100 or more employees and a sample of smaller plants.
52ENESTyC surveys are designed as separate cross-sections. Because of this, assigned plant identification
numbers are not unique across time. Close to 700 continuously surveyed plants are identified by INEGI,
constructing a balanced panel, which does not, however, contain any maquila plants. It is still possible to
match plants but only through company names and addresses. We have not been able to access this info
so far, due to confidentiality. So for maquila plants, plant identifications were not possible across time nor
between EIME and ENESTyC data-sets. Industry affiliation information for maquila plants in 2005 is not yet
available to us, so we are unable to provide sector-specific information at this time.
53While innovative activities are generally thought to be reflected in measured productivity, Teshima (2010),
among others, documents an increase in research and development expenditures among Mexican manufacturing
plants without significant effect on plant TFPs in response to trade liberalization.
54This question (Section 12, question 6 in ENESTyC 2005) asks whether a specified organization technique
has been implemented and the starting year of the implementation.
55Re-arrangement of Equipment is defined in the survey as ”management and organization of machinery,
equipment and facilities to carry out more efficient production and decrease the possibility of occupational
hazards”. The other productivity enhancing management concepts are well-known and their definitions follows
standard management literature.
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6 Conclusion
We analyze the impact of competition with China in the United States market on offshore plants of US
companies specializing in similar processes as Chinese plants. We exploit the exogenous intensification
of the market penetration by China around the time of its accession to WTO and the fact that not all
plants are exposed to the competition to the same degree, e.g. apparel or electronic plants are more
vulnerable than auto parts or food plants.
We find that employment in Mexican Maquiladoras is negatively affected by the competition with
China in the US market. Plant growths, entry and survival probabilities are also found to be responding
negatively to the Chinese competition. While there is no evidence found that Chinese competition
affects plants’ growth or exit disproportionately within the same industry classifications so as to
lead to welfare enhancing reallocation, competition is found to especially affect the most unskilled
labor-intensive sectors among the ones that are threatened most by Chinese competition, leading to
significant sectoral reallocation.
The results on skill-intensity and plant productivity point to within plant changes in response to the
competition. Together with auxiliary results on capacity utilization, productivity enhancing man-
agement strategies, and product development, they also suggest industrial upgrading in Mexican
Maquiladoras in response to competition with low-wage locations such as China.
Overall, the results show a substantial role of competition from China in the recent slowdown of the
Mexican Maquiladora industry. The results also give reason to open a discussion about whether and
how competition from lower wage locations can compel traditionally labor intensive industries in low
wage countries to move up in the global production chain.
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7 Tables and Figures
Table 2: The Impact of Chinese Competition : First Order Effects
Panel A: Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV SS IV FS
Dependent Variable lnSales lnSales lnSales lnSales IMPCHjt
IMPCHjt -2.399*** -3.055*** -2.582*** -4.454***
(0.511) (0.652) (0.621) (1.095)
IMPjt -1.375* -0.684
(0.671) (0.627)
lnUSPIjt 0.132**
(0.047)
RelWagejt -1.447**
(0.492)
AgeDummy 1 0.444*** 0.443*** 0.439*** 0.439** 0.001
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.002)
AgeDummy 2 0.385*** 0.391*** 0.392*** 0.383*** -0.001
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 0.045) (0.001)
Multi-plant Dummy -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.115*** -0.122** -0.001
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.001)
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 6.858***
(0.553)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Number of Plants 3769 3769 3769 3769 3769
Number of Observations 27548 27548 27548 27548 27548
R2 0.059 0.060 0.062 0.323
F-test of excluded instruments 153.99
Panel B: Export Value Added
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV SS IV FS
Dependent Variable lnXV AD lnXV AD lnXV AD lnXV AD IMPCHjt
IMPCHjt -1.960*** -2.774*** -2.418*** -4.205***
(0.434) (0.582) (0.582) (1.049)
IMPjt -1.707** -1.174*
(0.621) (0.587)
lnUSPIjt 0.096
(0.049)
RelWagejt -1.329**
(0.475)
AgeDummy 1 0.404*** 0.403*** 0.400*** 0.398** 0.001
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.002)
AgeDummy 2 0.341*** 0.348*** 0.349*** 0.338*** -0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.001)
Multi-plant Dummy -0.076** -0.076** -0.073** -0.079 -0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.001)
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 6.858***
(0.553)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Number of Plants 3769 3769 3769 3769 3769
Number of Observations 27548 27548 27548 27548 27548
R2 0.095 0.097 0.099 0.323
F-test of excluded instruments 153.99
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is the logarithm of sales. The dependent variable in Panel B is the logarithm of
export value-added. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1% levels respectively. First stage IV coefficients are presented in column
5. The instrument in the IV regression is the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports
interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese imports in other advanced/high income countries’ corresponding US NAICS. In IV
regressions state by year fixed effects are partialled out. A constant term is included but not reported.
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Table 3: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Employment
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable lnE lnE lnE lnE lnE
IMPCHjt -2.984*** -3.630*** -3.354*** -4.859*** -4.077***
(0.467) (0.587) (0.596) (1.036) (0.822)
IMPjt -1.354* -0.957 -1.416*
(0.586) (0.572) (0.652)
lnUSPIjt 0.078
(0.046)
RelWagejt -0.755
(0.415)
Age Dummy 1 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 0.447***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075)
Age Dummy 2 0.433*** 0.438*** 0.439*** 0.431*** 0.443***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Multi-plant Dummy -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.105*** -0.126***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Number of Plants 3769 3769 3769 3769 3721
Number of Observations 27548 27548 27548 27548 26354
R2 0.068 0.069 0.070
Panel B: First Stage IV
IMPCHjt IMPCHjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 6.858*** 7.929***
(0.553) (0.684)
LagIMP -0.407***
(0.048)
lnMERLag 0.031
(0.023)
R2 0.323 0.564
F-test of excluding instruments 153.99 70.09
IMPjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 0.045
(0.394)
LagIMP 0.893***
(0.030)
lnMERLag -0.034
(0.021)
R2 0.850
F-test of excluding instruments 258.78
Hansen J Test (P-value) 0.157
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of employment as measured by head count. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10
%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. For IV regressions the instrument for IMPCH in columns (4) and (5) is the worldwide
Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese imports
in other advanced/high income countries. In column (6), the instruments for IMP are the industry specific exchange
rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading partner’s currency are the lagged share of imports of that
particular trading partner (lnMERLag), and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican and
Chinese imports (LagIMP). In IV regressions state by year fixed effects are partialled out. A constant term is included but
not reported.
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Table 4: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Employment Growth I
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE
IMPCHjt -0.887* -1.825*** -1.502** -4.881*** -3.898***
(0.445) (0.543) (0.548) (1.221) (0.845)
IMPjt -1.732** -1.332* -2.311***
(0.542) (0.551) (0.676)
RelWagejt -0.074
(0.317)
lnUSPIjt 0.105*
(0.045)
Age Dummy 1 -0.651*** -0.649*** -0.648*** -0.655*** -0.645***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.094)
Age Dummy 2 -0.608*** -0.599*** -0.597*** -0.608*** -0.591***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055)
Multi-plant Dummy 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.080***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Number of Plants 3540 3540 3540 3540 3509
N 23743 23743 23743 23743 22597
R2 0.156 0.158 0.159
Panel B: First Stage IV
IMPCHjt IMPCHjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 6.994*** 8.377***
(0.715) (0.861)
LagIMP -0.421***
(0.048)
lnMERLag 0.033
(0.022)
R2 0.278 0.560
F-test of excluding instruments 95.61 50.38
IMPjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 0.149
(0.650)
LagIMP 0.886***
(0.030)
lnMERLag -0.033
(0.022)
R2 0.837
F-test of excluding instruments 175.33
Hansen J Test (P-value) 0.502
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of employment between two consecutive periods excluding
entrants and exiting plants. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in
each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1% levels respectively. For IV regressions the instrument
for IMPCH in column (4) and (5) is the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports
interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese imports in other advanced/high income countries. In column (5), the instruments
for IMP are the industry specific exchange rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading partner’s currency
are the lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner, and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed
without Mexican and Chinese imports. In IV regressions state by year fixed effects are partialled out. A constant term is
included but not reported.
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Table 5: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Employment Growth II
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE
IMPCHjt -1.598** -1.737*** -1.709***
(0.494) (0.491) (0.499)
IMPjt -1.598** -1.681** -1.721***
(0.521) (0.509) (0.504)
lnTFPijt 0.204*** 0.168*** 0.172***
(0.051) (0.043) (0.043)
Skill Intensity (NP/P)ijt 0.025
(0.020)
Capital-Labor Ratio (K/L)ijt 0.053
(0.028)
IMPCHjt ∗ lnTFPijt -0.768
(0.727)
IMPCHjt ∗ Skill Intensity (NP/P)ijt -0.066
(0.119)
IMPCHjt ∗ Capital Labor Ratio (K/L)ijt -0.276
(0.359)
Plant-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X
Number of Plants 3068 3062 3050
Number of Observations 18222 18206 18159
R2 0.156 0.157 0.160
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of employment between two consecutive
periods excluding entrants and exiting plants. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They
are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1%
levels respectively. Plant-level controls are a multi-plant dummy and age dummies. A constant term is
included but not reported.
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Table 6: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Maquiladora Exits
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Probit Probit Probit IV IV
Variables χ χ χ χ χ
IMPCH 1.701** 2.248*** 2.046*** 3.624*** 2.306**
(0.602) (0.590) (0.605) (0.992) (0.782)
IMP 1.232** 1.000 0.939*
(0.452) (0.555) (0.464)
RelWage 1.114*
(0.502)
lnUSIP -0.034
(0.068)
Age Dummy 1 0.031 0.026 0.026 0.036 0.019
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.040)
Age Dummy 2 0.161*** 0.153** 0.150** 0.163*** 0.149***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.039)
Multi-plant Dummy 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.038
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.11
N 25559 25559 25559 25559 24365
Panel B: First Stage IV
IMPCHjt IMPCHjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 6.718∗∗∗ 8.745***
(0.778) (0.049)
LagIMP -0.422***
(0.003)
lnMERlag 0.051***
(0.003)
IMPjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 0.270***
(0.032)
LagIMP 0.922***
(0.002)
lnMERlag -0.036***
(0.002)
The dependent variable is the indicator variable that takes 1 if the plant does not participate the next period (t+1).
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1% levels respectively. A constant term is included but not reported. For IV
regressions the instrument for IMPCH in column (4) and (5) is the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China)
as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 Chinese share of imports in other advanced/high income
countries. In column (5), the instruments for IMP are the industry specific exchange rate for the US industry where
the weights for each trading partner’s currency are the lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner, and
lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican and Chinese imports.
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Table 9: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Productivity
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP
IMPCH 0.456*** 0.411*** 0.442*** 0.393** 0.462** 0.563***
(0.101) (0.100) (0.124) (0.124) (0.165) (0.162)
IMP -0.106 -0.110 -0.132
(0.092) (0.097) (0.098)
Age Dummy 1 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age Dummy 2 -0.014* -0.014* -0.012 -0.011 -0.014* -0.013*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Multi-plant Dummy 0.013* 0.013* 0.012 0.012 0.013* 0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Entrant Dummy 0.012 0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
Entrant*IMPCH 0.030 0.024
(0.081) (0.081)
Exit Dummy -0.021* -0.021
(0.011) (0.011)
Exit*IMPCH 0.168 0.168
(0.095) (0.094)
R2 0.065 0.065 0.062 0.062
Number of Plants 3257 3257 3062 3062 3257 3169
N 20742 20742 18572 18572 20742 19942
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Panel B: First Stage IV
IMPCHjt IMPCHjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 6.593*** 7.626***
(0.549) (0.671)
R2 0.339 0.537
F-test of excluding statistics 144.16 66.73
IMPjt
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
∗ CHIMPtWIMPt -0.063
(0.377)
LagIMP 0.898***
(0.029)
lnMERlag -0.035
(0.022)
R2 0.832
F-test of excluding statistics 273.83
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of plant TFP. Calculation of TFP indices are explained in section C.1 in the appendix.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. A constant term is included but not reported. For IV regressions the
instrument for IMPCH in column (5) and (6) is the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports
interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese imports in other advanced/high income countries in the corresponding US NAICS for each
Maquiladora sector. In column (6) the instruments for IMP are the lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without
Mexican and Chinese imports and the industry specific exchange rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading partner’s
currency are the lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner.
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Table 10: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable Skill Intensity Skill Intensity Skill Intensity Skill Intensity
IMPCH 0.228 0.660** 1.810*** 1.357***
(0.217) (0.206) (0.339) (0.264)
IMP 0.901*** 1.088***
(0.157) (0.146)
Age Dummy 1 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Age Dummy 2 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.006
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Multi-Plant Dummy 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X
R2 0.034 0.035
Number of Plants 3638 3638 3638 3583
N 26369 26369 26369 25227
F-test of excluding statistics 156.96 69.20/256.49
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of administrators and technicians over workers. It is defined for
plants employing more than 1 person. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry
in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. The constant is included but not
reported. For IV regressions the instrument for IMPCH is the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in
total world imports interacted with the 1999 import share from China in the corresponding US NAICS for each Maquiladora
sector in other advanced countries. In column (4), the instruments for IMP are the industry specific exchange rate for the US
industry where the weights for each trading partner’s currency are the lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner,
and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican and Chinese imports.
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Table 11: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Relative Skilled Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable Relative Skilled Relative Skilled Relative Skilled Relative Skilled
Wages Wages Wages Wages
IMPCH 0.468** 0.459** 0.431* 0.468**
(0.161) (0.151) (0.190) (0.176)
IMP -0.017 -0.104
(0.120) (0.144)
Age Dummy 1 -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age Dummy 2 -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Multi-Plant Dummy 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X
R2 0.033 0.033
Number of Plants 3441 3441 3441 3391
N 24706 24706 24706 23644
F-test of excluding statistics 153.07 67.59/251.52
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average wages of skilled employees (administrators and technicians) over average
wages of unskilled employees (workers). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each
year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. A constant term is included but not reported. For IV
regressions the instrument for IMPCH is the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted
with the 1999 import share from China in the corresponding US NAICS for each Maquiladora sector in other advanced countries. In column
(4), the instruments for IMP are the industry specific exchange rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading partner’s
currency are lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner, and the lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed
without Mexican and Chinese imports.
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APPENDIX
A Descriptive Statistics Tables and Figures
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Figure A-1: Capital Equipment Investment in Maquiladora Industry By Country
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Figure A-2: Maquila Export Value Added (Source: INEGI )
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Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics: Panel Information
Year Number of Plants Years in the Panel Number of Plants
1990 1194 17 362
1991 1285 16 59
1992 1372 15 57
1993 1443 14 86
1994 1430 13 103
1995 1425 12 171
1996 1548 11 127
1997 1632 10 158
1998 1741 9 179
1999 1862 8 186
2000 1995 7 222
2001 2083 6 272
2002 1848 5 392
2003 1688 4 406
2004 1662 3 404
2005 1678 2 357
2006 1662 1 228
Note: The left hand side of the table shows the number of plants in a given year. The
right hand side of the table shows the distribution of plants over their length of the stay
in the panel.
Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics: Average Skill-
Intensity
Number of Employees 1990-2000 2001-2006
Overall 333.549 409.955
Entrants 83.438 87.827
SkilledWorkers
UnskilledWorkers 1990-2000 2001-2006
Overall 0.289 0.401
Entrants 0.339 0.609
Source: Plant-level Survey of Maquiladoras (INEGI). Authors’ calcula-
tion. SkilledWorkers
UnskilledWorkers
is defined for plants employing more than 1
person.
Table A-3: Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth over 1999-2006
Total Growth Within Plant Between Plants Net Entry Between Sectors
(Within Industry)
All 0.078 0.024 0.003 0.012 0.039
The decomposition exercise follows the analysis presented in section C.2.
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Table A-4: Evolution of Technology among Maquilas I: Descrip-
tive Statistics
Year Number of Plants Average Employment Foreign Owned
(Head Count) Capital (%)
1999 589 933.093 79.822
2001 675 1245.003 78.514
2005 791 800.510 82.729
Source: Encuesta Nacional De Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog`ıa Y Capacitaci`n (ENESTYC).
Authors’ calculation.
Table A-5: Evolution of Technology among
Maquilas II: Research and Development
Year Performed R&D Performed Product
(%) Development (%)
1997 38.879 20.713
1999 39.704 20.593
2004 45.891 32.111
Source: Encuesta Nacional De Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog`ıa Y
Capacitacio`n (ENESTyC). Authors’ calculation. In ENESTyC
1999, R&D questions refers to the year 1997. In ENESTyC 2001,
R&D questions refers to the year 1999 and in ENESTyC 2005,
R&D questions refers to the year 2004.
Table A-6: Evolution of Technology among Maquilas III: Capacity Utilization
Percentage Capacity Utilization
Year Maquila Plants Manufacturing Plants (Panel) All Manufacturing Plants
1997
Mean 81.3 76.0 72.3
Median 85 79 78
Standard Deviation 20.0 15.2 23.7
Observation 589 686 6806
1999
Mean 82.6 76.2 75.7
Median 85 80 80
Standard Deviation 16.4 17.4 20.1
Observation 675 690 8178
2004
Mean 85.7 76.9 76.9
Median 90 80 80
Standard Deviation 16.4 17.9 18.3
Observation 786 689 6364
Source: Encuesta Nacional De Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog`ıa Y Capacitaci`n (ENESTyC 1999, 2001, and 2005). Authors’ calculation.
The second column is among non-maquila manufacturing plants that are surveyed continuously by ENESTyC. The third column is
from all manufacturing (non-maquila) plants that are surveyed.
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Table A-7: Evolution of Technology among
Maquilas IV: Management and Organiza-
tion Techniques
Year 2000 2005
(%) (%)
Just in Time 20.1 41.1
Statistical Process Control 41.6 61.6
Total Quality Management 31.3 60.2
Job Rotation 22.7 46.8
Rearrangement of Equipment 26.0 55.0
Process Re-engineering 19.6 45.5
Number of (Maquila) Plants 642 791
Source: Encuesta Nacional De Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog`ıa
Y Capacitacio`n (ENESTYC) 2005. Authors’ calculation.
The information is derived from ENESTYC 2005, Section
12, question 6 which asks whether a specified technique has
been implemented, and, if so, the starting year of the im-
plementation. The survey also presents brief descriptions of
each technique to prevent recording errors.
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B Additional Robustness Checks
Table B-1: Robustness Check: Results with Alternative Instruments I
Instrument IMPCHj99 ∗ CHIMPtWIMPt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification IV IV IV IVProbit
Dependent Variable lnE ∆lnE Productivity χ
IMPCHjt -3.586*** -1.762** 0.514*** 1.962**
(0.681) (0.560) (0.119) (0.658)
AgeDummy 1 0.445*** -0.652*** -0.015 0.032
(0.074) (0.096) (0.009) (0.046)
AgeDummy 2 0.432*** -0.608*** -0.014* 0.162***
(0.047) (0.056) (0.006) (0.048)
Multi-plant Dummy -0.103*** 0.076*** 0.013* 0.052
(0.027) (0.019) (0.006) (0.034)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X No
Industry Fixed Effects No No No X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X
Number of Observation 27548 23743 20742 25559
IMPCHj99 ∗ CHIMPtWIMPt 12.685*** 14.295*** 12.367*** 15.099***
(1.393) (1.595) (1.390) (1.595)
R2 0.526 0.569 0.487
F-test of excluded instruments 82.93 80.29 40.76
Note: The dependent variable in column (1) is the logarithm of employment. The dependent variable in column
(2) is the annual employment growth among continuing plants. The dependent variable in column (3) is the plant
TFP. The dependent variable in column (3) is the plant exit indicator. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses and they are clustered by each industry and year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %,
5% and 1% levels respectively. State by year fixed effects are partialled-out. A constant term is included but not
reported.
49
Table B-2: Robustness Check: Results with Alternative Instruments II
Instrument
OAdvCHIMPjt
OAdvTOTIMPjt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification IV IV IV IVProbit
Dependent Variable lnE ∆lnE Productivity χ
IMPCHjt -4.659*** -2.661** 0.604** 2.351
(1.043) (0.937) (0.225) (1.279)
AgeDummy 1 0.444*** -0.653*** -0.015 0.025
(0.074) (0.096) (0.009) (0.046)
AgeDummy 2 0.436*** -0.608*** -0.014* 0.157**
(0.047) (0.057) (0.006) (0.048)
Multi-plant Dummy -0.128*** 0.074*** 0.015* 0.044
(0.026) (0.020) (0.006) (0.034)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X No
Industry Fixed Effects No No No X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X
Number of Observation 26354 23743 19942 24458
OAdvCHIMPjt
OAdvTOTIMPjt
0.472*** 0.485*** 0.465*** 0.485***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.069)
R2 0.292 0.326 0.303
F-test of excluded instruments 72.07 77.61 74.76
Note: The dependent variable in column (1) is the logarithm of employment. The dependent variable in column
(2) is the annual employment growth among continuing plants. The dependent variable in column (3) is the
plant TFP. The dependent variable in column (3) is the plant exit indicator. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and they are clustered by each industry and year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance
at the 10 %, 5% and 1% levels respectively. State by year fixed effects are partialled-out. A constant term is
included but not reported.
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Table B-3: Robustness: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Employment
Growth (additional plant-level controls)
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE ∆lnE
IMPCHjt -1.344** -2.111*** -1.862*** -4.714*** -2.718***
(0.435) (0.477) (0.467) (1.108) (0.701)
IMPjt -1.569** -1.233* -1.446**
(0.494) (0.496) (0.458)
RelWagejt 0.120
(0.246)
lnUSPIjt 0.089*
(0.039)
lnTFPijst 0.109** 0.109** 0.107** 0.123** 0.096*
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Size Dummies X X X X X
Plant Level Controls X X X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
N 18222 18222 18222 18222 15675
R2 0.228 0.230 0.230
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of employment between two consecutive years among
continuing plants. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, they are clustered for each industry in each
year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Plant-level controls are age,
size and multi-plant dummies. For IV regressions the instrument for IMPCH in column (4) and (5) is the worldwide
Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese
imports in other advanced/high income countries. In column (5), the instruments for IMP are the industry specific
exchange rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading partner’s currency are the lagged share of imports
of that particular trading partner, and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican and
Chinese imports. A constant term is included but not reported.
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Table B-4: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Maquiladora Exits (additional
plant-level controls)
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Probit Probit Probit IV IV
Variables χ χ χ χ χ
IMPCHjt 2.103** 2.794*** 2.113* 4.400*** 3.119**
(0.792) (0.813) (0.826) (1.321) (1.110)
IMPjt 1.790** 1.037 1.538*
(0.633) (0.726) (0.652)
lnUSPIjt -0.158*
(0.075)
Relative Wage (
MXWagejt
USWagejt
) 0.390
(0.651)
Size -0.352*** -0.353*** -0.354*** -0.351*** -0.360***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
Productivity -0.406*** -0.405*** -0.404*** -0.422*** -0.378***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.089)
Productivity Square 0.394*** 0.391*** 0.392*** 0.401*** 0.366***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.070)
Age Dummy 1 -0.296*** -0.302*** -0.302*** -0.289*** -0.311***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
Age Dummy 2 0.039 0.027 0.027 0.041 0.026
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053)
Multi-plant Dummy 0.096* 0.093* 0.093* 0.099* 0.089*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044)
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X
N 18504 18504 18504 18504 17840
Pseudo R2 0.227 0.228 0.229
The dependent variable is the indicator variable that takes 1 if the plant does not participate the next period (t+1).
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Size variable is measured by the logarithm of labor.
The constant is included but not reported. For IV regressions the instrument for IMPCH in columns (4) and (5) is
the worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares
of Chinese imports in other advanced/high income countries. In column (5), the instruments for IMP are the industry
specific exchange rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading partner’s currency are the lagged share of
imports of that particular trading partner, and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican
and Chinese imports.
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Table B-5: Productivity: Balanced Sample
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP
IMPCH 0.770*** 0.732*** 0.728*** 0.789** 1.227***
(0.155) (0.144) (0.146) (0.245) (0.289)
IMP -0.294* -0.283* -0.306*
(0.124) (0.141) (0.141)
USIP 0.002
(0.007)
Age Dummy 1 -0.046 -0.055 -0.054 -0.045 -0.018
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026)
Age Dummy 2 -0.108** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.107** -0.106**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Multi-plant Dummy 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
R2 0.158 0.159 0.159
N 4755 4755 4755 4755 4504
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of plant TFP. Calculation of TFP indices are explained in section
C.1 in the appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are clustered for each industry
in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10 %, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. A constant term is
included but not reported. For IV regressions the instrument for IMPCH in column (4) and (5) is the worldwide
Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese
imports in other advanced/high income countries in the corresponding US NAICS for each Maquiladora sector. In
column (5) the instruments for IMP are the lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican
and Chinese imports and the industry specific exchange rate for the US industry where the weights for each trading
partner’s currency are the lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner.
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Table B-6: The Impact of Chinese Competition on Productivity : Alternative Productivity
Measure
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Dependent Variable lnTFP-Fix lnTFP-Fix lnTFP-Fix lnTFP-Fix lnTFP-Fix
IMPCH 0.448** 0.370∗ 0.391∗ 0.600** 0.640**
(0.136) (0.169) (0.171) (0.223) (0.221)
IMP 0.049 0.056
(0.132) (0.136)
Age Dummy 1 0.012 -0.004 -0.004 0.012 0.013
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Age Dummy 2 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Multi-Plant Dummy -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Entrant Dummy 0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.009)
Entrant*IMPCH -0.147 -0.144
(0.134) (0.135)
Exit Dummy -0.076*** -0.076***
(0.016) (0.016)
Exit*IMPCH 0.378* 0.378*
(0.149) (0.149)
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X
Number of Observations 20742 18572 18572 20742 19942
R2 0.053 0.052 0.052
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of TFP, where TFP is calculated using fixed effects model. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each year. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
the 10 %, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. A constant term is included but not reported. The instrument for IMPCH is the
worldwide Chinese imports (exports from China) as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese
imports in other advanced countries. In column (5), the instruments for IMP are the industry specific exchange rate for the US
industry where the weights for each trading partner’s currency are the lagged share of imports of that particular trading partner,
and lagged values of import-penetration rates constructed without Mexican and Chinese imports.
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Table B-7: Late Sample: 1999-2006 First Order Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dependent Variable lnSales lnSales lnXV ad lnXV ad lnE lnE
IMPCH -1.962* -3.352** -2.038** -2.738** -3.264*** -4.008***
(0.858) (1.172) (0.705) (1.042) (0.734) (1.203)
R2 0.045 0.046 0.050
Number of Observations 14478 14478 14478 14478 14478 14478
Plant-level controls X X X X X X
Plant Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year by State Fixed Effects X X X X X X
The sample period is 1999-2006. Plant-level controls are age dummies and multi-plant dummy. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. They are clustered for each industry in each year. The instrument for IMPCH is the worldwide Chinese
imports as a share in total world imports interacted with the 1999 shares of Chinese imports in other advanced/high income
countries.
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C Sources and Construction of the Data
C.1 Calculation of Plant TFPs
We use a KLEM approach and calculate a multi-factor productivity index using gross-output measures.
In order to calculate an index that is comparable across firms and years, we follow Aw, et al. (2001)
and use the extension of the total factor productivity index proposed by Good, et al. (1997) that
incorporates both the chaining approach and the hypothetical firm approach of Caves, et al. (1982)
which is suitable for a panel data-setting. Assuming an underlying production technology represented
by an unrestricted constant returns to scale translog function, Caves et al. (1982), derive a superlative
TFP index which is expressed relative to a hypothetical firm, allowing the index to be transitive
across firms. Good et al. (1997) extend this index using the chaining approach to make it sample
independent, so that it can be used for both cross-section and across time comparisons. The TFP index
is calculated separately for each industry. To do that, for each industry we construct a hypothetical
firm whose subcomponent expenditure shares are the arithmetic mean expenditure shares and whose
subcomponent quantities (as measured by deflated sales) are the geometric means of the subcomponent
quantities for each cross section. We then chain the hypothetical firms together over time. So the
TFP index is calculated as follows:
lnTFPit = (qit − qt) +
t∑
s=2
(qs − qs−1) − [
∑
j=k,sl,ul,e,m
0.5 ∗ (αjit + αjt )(xjit − xjit)+
t∑
s=2
∑
j=k,sl,ul,e,m
0.5 ∗ (αjs + αjs−1)(xjs − xjs−1)]
(C-1)
where qit is the logarithm of deflated sales of plant i, and x
j
it is the logarithm of the input j used by
plant i at period t, where the type of input is indicated with superscript j = sl, ul, k, e,m. sl denotes
skilled labor measured by the total number of administrative and technical personnel, ul denotes
unskilled labor as measured by the total number of workers, k denotes capital measured by the deflated
rental expenditures on buildings, machinery and equipment, e denotes energy measured by deflated
expenditures on fuel and electricity and m denotes materials measured by deflated expenditures on
domestic and imported materials. Input weights, αj ’s, are calculated using the share of expenditure
of input j in the total expenditures of firms, and so constant returns to scale are implicitly assumed.
The bar indicates an average over the relevant variable (e.g. qt indicates the natural logarithm of the
geometric average for output across all plants within an industry at period t). In equation C-1 both
output and input are expressed in two parts. The first parts express output and input in relation to
the hypothetical or representative firm of the current period, and the second parts express the change
in the representative firm across time.
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C.2 Productivity Decomposition
Following Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster et al. (1999), we decompose the aggregate produc-
tivity growth into within-plant, reallocation within sector, turnover and reallocation between sectors
components as follows:
∆Pt =
∑
j
sjt [
∑
i∈Cj
sjt∆P
j
it] +
∑
j
sjt [
∑
i∈Cj
(pji − P j)∆sjit] +
∑
j
P jt ∆s
j
t+
∑
j
sjt [
∑
i∈Nj
(sjit(p
j
it − P j)) −
∑
i∈Xj
(sjit−1(p
j
it−1 − P j))]
(C-2)
Here a bar over a variable indicates the average of the variable over the base (t-1) and end year (t), i
denotes plant, j denotes industry. Market shares are measured using export value-added. Pt denotes
the aggregate industry productivity, Pt =
∑
j s
j
tP
j
t where s
j
t is industry j’s share of total export value-
added. Cj refers to a set of continuing plants in sector j, Nj refers to a set of entering plants in sector
j, and Xj refers to a set of exiting plants in sector j. The first term,
∑
j s
j
t [
∑
i∈Cj s
j
t∆P
j
it] denotes the
within-plant component, the second term is the within-industry reallocation term, the third term is
reallocation between sectors followed by the net entry component.
C.3 Matching NAICS with Maquiladoras
INEGI has conducted an annual survey of the universe of plants registered under the maquiladora
program and constructed one service and eleven manufacturing sectors, called ’economic groups’. In
this paper, the 11 maquiladora industries were matched with the US NAICS. To do so, we use survey
results conducted by INEGI, Direccio´n De Estad´ısticas De Comercio Exterior, Registros Administra-
tivos Y Precios. Maquiladora sectors are tied to the US industries vertically within generally 4-digit
industries (plants import from and export to the same 4-digit industries). In Table C-1, we provide the
names of the eleven maquiladora sectors and the corresponding US NAICS. This matching is further
confirmed by converting export trade data in 2-digit HS codes as reported by Banco de Me´xico to
3-digit NAICS.
C.4 Import Penetration Rates and other Aggregate Variables
To calculate import penetration in the U.S., data from the Center for International Data at U.C. Davis
on exports and imports by industry and country were used. The information is provided in 6-digit
NAICS classification. Output information is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The matching is based on the combination of 4-digits NAICS as described in Table C-1.
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The U.N. comtrade database is used to estimate import shares of the advanced countries. The U.N.
comtrade information is provided in six-digit Harmonized System (HS) codes. The concordances
developed by Pierce and Schott (2009) that link each ten-digit import and export HS code to a single
six-digit NAICS (NAICS) industry are utilized. These concordances provide a mapping of HS to
NAICS industries from 1989 to 2006. The advanced countries used in constructing the 1999 shares of
Chinese imports in other advanced/high income countries,
OAdvCHIMPj99
OAdvTOTIMPj99
, are Australia, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland; these countries are chosen to match
the countries in Autor et al. (2012). In constructing the Chinese import shares in other high-income
countries,
OAdvCHIMPjt
OAdvTOTIMPjt
, only seven of the advanced countries are used due to missing data in certain
maquila matched industries in year 1997 for Denmark. Since Germany does not have data for the year
1990 (due to the unification), the sample for
OAdvCHIMPjt
OAdvOTIMPjt
starts in 1991.
The source for the world-wide Chinese imports as well as world-wide total imports is the World Bank.
Data on industry specific U.S. hourly wages is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS). To estimate
maquiladora hourly wages, total worker wages reported in the plant-level data set were aggregated
at the industry level and converted to the US dollar term using the nominal exchange rate between
Mexican peso and the US dollar. The source for the nominal exchange rate between US dollar and
Mexican peso is Banco de Me´xico. The relative wage variable, RelWage, which is used as an aggregate
industry level control, is then constructed by dividing industry specific maquiladora hourly wages by
their U.S. industry counterpart. Both US and maquiladora wages do not include benefits to workers.
US wages are based on 3-digit NAICS matching. The source for the U.S. industrial production index,
USPI, is the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. With the exception of ECOGROUP 1, which only
corresponds to a single 4-digit NAICS, matching of the US production index is based on 3-digit NAICS.
The source of industry-specific exchange rate measures for the US manufacturing industries, MER
and MERlag, is Goldberg (2004). The data can be downloaded from http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/global_economy/industry_specific_exrates.html These measures are constructed by
using the time histories of the weights of U.S. trading partners in the imports of each U.S. industry.
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